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Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the Wake of Goldman Sachs and the
Malaysian Bribery Scandal
* By Adina Feder

Save

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (“Goldman Sachs” or “Goldman”), a global banking behemoth, was finally struck with financial penalties of
$3.3 billion due to its participation in a Malaysian bribery scheme.[1] The Bank admitted to paying more than $1.6 million in bribes to
prominent government officials to obtain lucrative business from 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (“1MDB”), a Malaysian owned
sovereign wealth fund.[2] In exchange for the bribes, Goldman became the lead adviser on energy acquisitions and underwrote three bond
offerings for approximately $6.5 billion, earning the Bank hundreds of millions in revenue.[3] Goldman admitted that there were red flags
surrounding the transactions, including “the [excessive] amount of money made from relatively plain bond deals” and the involvement of
corrupt Malaysian financier, Jho Low.[4] Yet somehow, they flew under Goldman’s radar even after purportedly comprehensive review by
five internal committees.[5] The fund’s shady business spurred investigations in theU.S., the U.K., Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong.

[6] Goldman’s Malaysian subsidiary, (“GS Malaysia”), has now pled guilty to conspiring to violate anti-bribery provisions in the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), and the parent company entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) with the Department of
Justice, culminating in what has been referred to as the “largest monetary penalty ever assessed under corporate criminal bribery law.”[7]
Critics argue that after years of litigating this cataclysmic financial scandal, a mere DPA as punishment is underwhelming.[8] The deal,
while costing Goldman $600 million in disgorgement and $2.3 million in fines, “allows Goldman Sachs and its executives [to] evade
additional criminal prosecution.”[9] DPAs have become increasingly popular in corporate crime proceedings, allowing prosecutors to file
criminal charges but stay or dismiss those charges after a period of time if the company fulfills the agreement obligations.[10] As such,
commenters claim DPAs are “too soft on corporate crime.”[11] However, after the Enron scandal, the DOJ has stated it seeks to “reform
corrupt corporate cultures-that is to effect widespread structural reform – rather than to indict, to prosecute and to punish.”[12] The query
is whether DPAs inspire big corporations to actually reform, or merely allow big players such as Goldman Sachs to evade prosecution and
keep on operating as they were with a small slap on the wrist.[13]
In the past, perhaps it was true that DPAs had no bite due to a lack of individual accountability, but here, Goldman did not get off so easily.
[14] Likely in reaction to public opposition to DPAs, the government has now begun to charge individual corporate directors, and did so
here.[15] Moreover, despite all the critiques DPAs receive, they allow “prosecutors [to] avoid the difficulties and uncertainty in trying a
corporate criminal,” and “foster cooperative relationships between prosecutors and delinquent corporations.” [16]
Given Goldman Sachs’ position in the global sphere, a “lack of consequences for criminal corporate behavior” approach is neither
beneficial nor advantageous to both the corporation and its clientele and can cause financial ruin. However, when paired with individual
corporate accountability, perhaps a DPA is more effective than we thought.

* Adina Feder is a 2L at Cardozo Law School and holds a B.A. in Psychology from Queens
College.
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